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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (Supp. 
1990) and Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Tax Commission err in holding that 
Petitioner was liable for sales tax in Utah even though 
Petitioner had already paid sales tax on the property at 
issue in Nevada? 
2. Did the Tax Commission err in holding that 
Petitioner was liable for sales tax on the purchase of 
building materials used in the construction of a hotel even 
though Petitioner did not install such materials? 
3. Did the Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax 
Commission") err in holding that purchases of building 
materials made by Petitioner and incorporated into real 
property owned by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints ("LDS Church") were not exempt from sales tax as 
sales to a religious organization? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTE ANP fiU^gg 
Petitioner identifies the following constitutional 
provision, statutes, ordinances and rules as those "whose 
1 
interpretation is determinative" within the meaning of Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(6). 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(8) (1953 as 
amended) which provides: 
The following sales and uses are exempt 
from the taxes imposed by this chapter— 
sales made to or by religious or 
charitable institutions in the conduct 
of their regular religious or charitable 
functions and activities. 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-12-104(28) (1953 as 
amended) which provides: 
The following sales and uses are exempt 
from the taxes imposed by this chapter— 
property upon which a sales or use tax 
was paid to some other state, or one of 
its subdivision, except that the state 
shall be paid any difference between the 
tax paid and the tax imposed by this 
part and Part 2, and no adjustment is 
allowed if the tax paid was greater than 
the tax imposed by this part and Part 2. 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-12-118 (1953 as 
amended) which provides: 
The administration of this chapter is 
vested in and shall be exercised by the 
commission which may prescribe forms and 
rules to conform with this chapter for 
the making of returns and for the 
ascertainment, assessment, and 
collection of the taxes imposed under 
this chapter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The issues on appeal concern the assessment of Utah 
sales tax on materials sold to Petitioner, a subcontractor, 
2 
and subsequently transported out of state and incorporated 
into real property pursuant to six separate contracts. 
Petitioner has already paid sales tax to the state of Nevada 
on materials relating to four of these contracts. In 
addition, in connection with one of these four contracts, 
Petitioner was a joint venturer who transferred the 
materials to the other joint venturer who eventually 
installed the materials into real property. The remaining 
two contracts involve Petitioner's purchase of materials 
which were incorporated into real property owned by the LDS 
Church. 
The Commission assessed a sales tax against Petitioner 
under all six contracts notwithstanding express statutory 
sales tax exemptions for (1) sales of property upon which a 
sales tax was paid to another state and (2) sales made to 
religious organizations, and even though Petitioner was not 
the final consumer of the building materials relating to the 
Ramada Contract. 
B. Procedural History and Agency Disposition 
On July 26, 1990, after auditing Petitioner's business 
records, the Commission notified Petitioner that it owed 
sales tax for the purchase of materials which Petitioner 
subsequently incorporated into real property under various 
construction contracts. The Commission also notified 
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Petitioner of its rights to seek a redetermination. 
Thereafter, on August 22, 1990, Petitioner filed a Petition 
for Redetermination with the Commission. Respondents 
answered the Petition for Redetermination on September 14, 
1990 and Petitioner replied to Respondents Answer on 
October 10, 1990. 
After the filing of briefs, the Commission held a 
formal hearing on May 1, 1991, before an administrative law 
judge (hereinafter the "Hearing") to determine whether 
Petitioner should be exempted from sales tax regarding the 
contracts at issue. 
On December 6, 1991, the Commission entered an order 
denying Petitioner's Petition for Redetermination. 
Thereafter, on January 3, 1992, Petitioner filed a Petition 
for Review with the Utah Supreme Court. On May 22, 1992, 
this case was poured-over from the Utah Supreme Court to the 
Court of Appeals for disposition. 
RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATIONS TO THE RECORD 
1. Petitioner fabricates iron and steel into 
staircases, railings and ornamental articles. R. 0010. 
2. During the period from October 1, 1986 through 
September 31, 1989, Petitioner entered into six 
subcontracting agreements with various prime contractors. 
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R. 0010, R. 0011. (The six contracts are hereinafter 
collectively referred to as the "Contracts.") 
a. The first agreement relates to the 
construction of a hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada called the 
Barbary Coast Hotel ("Barbary Contract"). R. 0080-89. 
b. The second agreement relates to the 
construction of a hotel in Laughlin, Nevada called the 
Ramada Station ("Ramada Contract"). R. 0072-79. 
c. The third agreement relates to work performed 
on the McCarran International Airport which is owned by 
Clark County, Nevada ("McCarran Contract"). R. 0058-60. 
d. The fourth agreement relates to work 
performed on the Downtown Transportation Center 
building which is owned by the city of Las Vegas 
("Transportation Center Contract"). R. 0061-63. 
e. The fifth agreement relates to the 
construction of a temple owned by the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints ("LDS Church") in Las 
Vegas, Nevada ("Las Vegas Temple Contract"). R. 0053-
57. 
f. The sixth agreement relates to the 
construction of a temple owned by the LDS Church in 
Portland Oregon ("Portland Temple Contract"). R. 0039-
51. 
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3. At no time did Petitioner install any of materials 
relating to the Contracts into real property. Rather, 
Petitioner subcontracted the installation to other 
companies. R. 0011. 
4. Petitioner has already paid sales tax to the state 
of Nevada on materials it purchased in connection with the 
Ramada Contract, the Barbary Coast Contract, McCarran 
Contract and the Transportation Center Contract. R. 0013. 
5. In regards to the Ramada Contract, Petitioner 
entered into a joint venture with Stott Construction, Inc. 
("Stott") whereby Stott agreed to install the steel products 
fabricated by Petitioner. R. 0012. 
6. In connection with the Ramada Contract, the prime 
contractor understood and agreed that Petitioner would not 
be responsible for the installation of such products. R. 
0320. Rather, Petitioner contracted with Stott that Stott 
would be "entirely" responsible for such installation. See 
Hearing Transcript, at 50. Thereafter, Stott installed the 
iron and steel products fabricated by Petitioner into the 
Ramada Hotel pursuant to the terms of the Ramada Contract. 
R. 0011. 
7. In regards to the Las Vegas Temple Contract and 
the Portland Temple Contract, Petitioner acted as a 
subcontractor on construction projects involving real 
6 
property owned by the LDS Church, a tax exempt religious 
organization. R. 0011, R. 0177, R. 0126-134. 
8. The materials relating to the Contracts were all 
purchased in Utah and delivered to Petitioner in Utah under 
a contractual obligation with the prime contractors that 
Petitioner would deliver the materials to their final out of 
state destinations. R. 0015-16. The materials were 
ultimately delivered and incorporated into their respective 
out of state sites. R. 0015-16. 
9. During the summer of 1990, the auditing division 
audited Petitioner's business records for the time period 
from October 1, 1986 through September 31, 1989 and assessed 
Petitioner $64,019.73 in tax and interest for the six 
contracts at issue. R. 0473-0480. 
gVMMAPY OF ARGVMgNT 
A. Petitioner is Entitled to a Credit for Sales Tax Paid 
to the State of Nevada. 
Utah statute, by express provision, mandates that a 
taxpayer be credited for sales tax which it has already paid 
to another state. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(28) (1953 as 
amended). Because section 59-12-104(28) is unambiguous, 
this Court need look no further to interpret the statutefs 
meaning. Therefore, since Petitioner has already paid sales 
tax to the state of Nevada for the Barbary, Ramada, 
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Transportation Center and McCarran Contracts, this Court 
should order the Commission to credit Petitioner for such 
amounts. 
B. Petitioner is Entitled to a Sales Tax Exemption for the 
Materials it Fabricated and which were Incorporated 
into the Portland and Las Vegas Temples. 
Utah statute provides that "sales made to or by 
religious or charitable institutions in the conduct of their 
regular religious or charitable activities" are exempt from 
sales tax. The Commission, in exceeding its statutory grant 
of authority, has promulgated regulations which 
substantially limit the application of this statute. Such 
regulations are invalid. 
In addition, the policy underlying the sales tax 
exemption for religious organizations, requires that the 
exemption apply to indirect as well as to direct sales of 
construction materials. Otherwise the sales tax would be 
passed on to religious organizations, rendering the statute 
ineffectual. 
C. Petitioner Neither Installed nor was it Contractually 
Required to Install its Fabricated Products Under the 
Ramada Contract. 
Petitioner and Stott entered into the Ramada Contract 
as joint venturers. Under the terms of the Ramada Contract, 
Stott was obligated to install, and in fact installed, the 
iron and steel products fabricated by Petitioner. 
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Therefore, Petitioner was not the consumer of such products 
are is not subject to sales tax thereon. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER IS EXEMPT FROM PAYING 
SALES TAX ON ITEMS OF PROPERTY UPON 
WHICH A SALES TAX HAS ALREADY 
BEEN PAID TO ANOTHER STATE 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(28) (1953 as amended) 
provides a sales tax exemption for 
property upon which a sales or use tax 
was paid to some other state, or one of 
its subdivision, except that the state 
shall be paid any difference between the 
tax paid and the tax imposed by this 
part and Part 2, and no adjustment is 
allowed if the tax paid was greater than 
the tax imposed by this part and Part 2. 
(emphasis added). 
The statute clearly provides an exemption for property 
upon which a sales tax has already been paid. In its 
decision, however, the Commission failed to cite* this 
statute. Rather, it set forth the unsupported conclusion 
that "the taxes owed by the Petitioner were first due and 
owing to the state." R. 00017. Section 59-12-104(28), 
however, makes no mention of taxes being first due and owing 
to the state of Utah as an exception to that statute. This 
Court should not allow the Commission to supplant express 
statutory commands with unsupported conclusions. 
9 
The Commission further asserted that its conclusion was 
"in accord with the multi-state tax compact as adopted by 
Utah and codified as §59-1-801, Utah Code., 1953, as 
amended." The authority cited, however, does not support 
the Commission's assertion. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-801 (1953 
as amended) provides: 
Each purchaser liable for a use tax on 
tangible personal property shall be 
entitled to full credit for the combined 
amount or amounts of legally imposed 
sales or use taxes paid by him with 
respect to the same property to another 
state and any subdivision thereof. The 
credit shall be applied first against 
the amount of any use tax due the state, 
and any unused portion of the credit 
shall then be applied against the amount 
of any use tax due a subdivision, 
(emphasis added). 
This statute provides only that the purchaser "shall be 
entitled to full credit for the combined amount or amounts 
of legally imposed sales or use taxes paid by him with 
respect to the same property to another state." The 
Commission's conclusions to the contrary, the statute does 
not establish a priority scheme between states. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court addressed this precise issue 
in State v. Sinclair Pipeline Co.. 605 P.2d 377 (Wyo. 1980). 
A four to one majority of that court held that the meaning 
of the interstate compact, which had also been adopted by 
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Wyoming, was plain and unambiguous. Id. at 379. The court 
stated 
The statute says that a taxpayer 
who has wpaidw his tax to one state will 
receive a credit upon any tax which may 
be due another state on that same 
property. In the instant matter, 
Sinclair had paid, the Wyoming tax 
before Colorado ever assessed the 
taxpayer. If Sinclair owed the State of 
Colorado a tax, it was a sum less the 
amount it had paid Wyoming. That is 
what the statute says. 
The statute is not ambiguous and, 
when a statute is clear as to its 
meaning, we may not resort to rules of 
construction . . . . 
The statute says nothing about the 
"first taxable incident ....'• 
We need not look to any general 
rules of use taxation to read this 
statute. Pfrjfl w$ZJ\9 paiflt NQthipq 
<?QU14 be mpre c?3rear. It means that 
payment has occurred. Under Article V, 
when a proper use-tax payment has 
occurred in one state, another taxing 
entity seeking to impose a use tax on 
the same property must give credit to 
the taxpayer for the first-paid tax. 
That is what the statute says and we are 
not allowed to give it another meaning. 
Id. at 379-80 (emphasis added). 
As the taxpayer in Sinclair, Petitioner has already 
paid a sales tax to another state, the state of Nevada. 
Therefore, the Court should reverse the Commission's 
decision regarding Petitioners previously paid taxes and 
order the Commission to credit Petitioner for those taxes. 
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In addition, the interstate commerce clause of the 
United States Constitution mandates that the taxes imposed 
by a state not discriminate against interstate commerce. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Halliburton Oil Well 
Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963) upheld the 
constitutional prohibition against taxing interstate 
commerce. The imposition, without an offset credit, of the 
sales tax by the State of Utah on products already subject 
to sales tax in Nevada and on which the sales tax in Nevada 
was paid are discriminatory against interstate commerce and 
violative of the interstate commerce clause.1 
II. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A 
SALES TAX EXEMPTION FOR SALES MADE TO 
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 
Utah Code Annotated Section 59-12-104(8) provides that 
"sales made to or by religious or charitable institutions in 
the conduct of their regular religious or charitable 
activities . . . M are exempt from sales taxes. The statute 
is clear on its face and contains no restrictions so long as 
the sale is made ,fin the conduct of . . . regular religious 
or charitable activities." 
The Utah Legislature, in enacting the Sales and Use Tax 
Act, empowered the Commission to "prescribe forms and rules 
1See also Utah Code Ann. S 59-12-104(12) which prohibits the tax on 
the sale of property in interstate commerce. 
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to conform" with the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-118 (1953 
as amended)• 
The Commission has promulgated the following regulations 
relating to sales tax exemptions for charitable 
institutions. 
The sale of real property is not subject 
to the tax nor is the labor performed on 
real property. For example, the sale of 
a completed home or building is not 
subject to the tax, but sales of 
materials and supplies to contractors 
and subcontractors are taxable 
transactions as sales to final 
consumers. This is true whether the 
contract js performed fqy an individual, 
a religious institution, or a 
qpvernK3ntal ingtrwentaUtyt Utah 
Admin. R. 865-19-58S(3) (1992). 
(emphasis added). 
Sales of materials to religious or 
charitable institutions and government 
agencies are exempt only if sold as 
tangible personal property and the 
seller does not install the material as 
an improvement to realty or use it to 
repair real property. Utah Admin. R. 
865-19-58S(4) (1992). 
These two tax rules do not conform to the Act and are, 
therefore, invalid and unenforceable to the extent of their 
nonconformity. This court has previously held that "[a]n 
administrative agency's authority to promulgate regulations 
is limited to those regulations which are consonant with the 
statutory framework, and neither contrary to the statute nor 
beyond its scope." Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 762 
13 
P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah App. 1992); see also Lockheed Aircraft 
Corp. v. State Tax C O M . . 566 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah 1977). 
The statute grants a sales tax exemption to charitable 
organizations so long as the sale is made in the conduct of 
regular religious activities. The Commission's rules, 
however, restrict the application of that exemption. "An 
administrative agency may not deny a tax . . . exemption." 
2 Am. Jur.2d S 301 (1962); see also Olson Constr. Co. v. 
State Tax Comm.. 361 P.2d 1112, 1114 (Utah 1961)(holding 
that Commission rules cannot "grant an exemption where the 
statutes grant none" and thereby implying the converse that 
Commission rules cannot eliminate an exemption where granted 
by statutes). 
In the absence of the Commission's rules, there can be 
no question that Petitioner would be granted a sales tax 
exemption under section 59-12-104(8). Administrative Rules 
865-19-58S(3) and 865-19-58S(4) deny this exemption and are, 
therefore, contrary to the statute. The Commission has 
exceeded its statutory grant of power in establishing rules 
865-19-58S(3) and 865-19-58S(4) which should be invalidated 
to the extent that they conflict with Utah Code Ann. § 59-
12-104(8). 
As noted above, Utah Code Annotated Section 59-12-
104(8) provides that "sales made to or by religious or 
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charitable institutions in the conduct of their regular 
religious or charitable activities • . . " are exempt from 
sales taxes. The Commission held that this section did not 
apply to the facts at issue because Petitioner did not sell 
its materials directly to a religious organization, but 
rather sold the materials directly to the prime contractor 
which in turn sold the materials to the LDS Church. In 
adopting the sales tax exemption for religious and 
charitable organizations, the Utah legislature clearly 
intended to eliminate the sales tax liability for such 
organizations so long as the sales were made in the regular 
course of the organization's activities. 
This exemption should be interpreted to apply both to 
direct and indirect sales so as to avoid "the indirect 
imposition of the tax [on the religious organization] when 
construction materials are sold to contractors for resale to 
such institutions. Exempting such sales to contractors 
prevents the tax from being passed on [to the religious 
organization] as part of the contractor's cost." Perlstein 
Builders, Inc. New York State Tax Comm. , 449 N.Y.S.2d 355, 
356 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982). To hold otherwise renders the 
exemption for charitable institutions ineffectual since the 
"legal incidence" would fall on those institutions. See 
15 
Scotsmans MFG. Co, Inc. v, State. 808 P.2d 517, 521 (Nev. 
1991). 
III. PETITIONER WAS NOT THE CONSUMER OF 
ITS FABRICATED PRODUCTS UNDER THE RAMADA 
CONTRACT AND IS, THEREFORE, NOT SUBJECT 
TO A SALES TAX FOR THE PURCHASE OF 
MATERIALS UNDER THAT CONTRACT. 
The Commission erroneously held that Petitioner 
converted the products it had fabricated into real property 
under the Ramada Contract, thereby subjecting Petitioner to 
sales tax. According to rule Utah Admin. R. 865-19-
58(A)(3), sales of construction materials are taxable to the 
final consumer of such materials.2 The final consumer is 
defined as the "person who converts the personal property 
into real property." Utah Admin. R. 865-19-58S(l) (1992). 
In connection with the Ramada Contract, however, 
Petitioner had entered into a joint venture arrangement with 
Stott wherein Petitioner was to fabricate the steel and iron 
ornamental work and Stott was to install the fabricated 
material into the Ramada Hotel. At the Hearing, the 
following examination of Wilford Niederhauser, president and 
manager of Petitioner, took place: 
THE HEARING OFFICER: I guess what I'm asking , 
Mr. Niederhauser, is this agreement that you had 
Sales of materials and supplies to contractors and sub-contractors 
are taxable transactions as sales to final consumers. Utah Admin. R. 
865-19-58S(A)(3). 
16 
with Stott when you went in and bid this job for 
the Ramada Station; was that just a verbal 
agreement between you and Stott— 
WITNESS: Oh, no. No, no. 
THE HEARING OFFICER: —as to what each party was 
supposed to do? 
THE WITNESS: No we have to—we have to—when we 
estimate a job, we have to come out with all the 
different items that have to be furnished and—and 
that was separated between the two of us, who was 
going to do what. 
THE HEARING OFFICER: And so there are specific 
duties— 
THE WITNESS: Yeah 
THE HEARING OFFICER: And with respect to the 
installation aspect of— 
THE WITNESS: Well, the installation Stott did 
entirely. 
THE HEARING OFFICER: And was that included in the 
agreement? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. Yeah. Sge Transcript, at 49-50. 
The prime contractor was aware of this arrangement and 
had even agreed to it. See R. 0320, In addition, the 
Commission found that a joint venture existed between 
Petitioner and Stott and that Stott installed the materials 
at issue into the Ramada Hotel. R. 0012. In spite of its 
finding that Stott was contractually obligated to install 
the materials which it did, the Commission nevertheless held 
that Petitioner owed sales tax associated with the Ramada 
17 
Contract. However, since Petitioner was not the person who 
converted the material into the Ramada Hotel, Petitioner 
should not be held liable for the related sales tax. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the 
Commission's Order and adjudge that no tax is owing under 
the Contracts. 
day of October, 1992. DATED this 
B. Lindsay 
Attorneys for Petitioji^r 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF PETITIONER was mailed, postage 
prepaid, on this of October, 1992 to the following: 
John C. McCarrey 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax and Business Regulation Division 
36 South State 
Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
CASE No. 920338-CA 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
NIEDERHAUSER ORNAMENTAL & 
METAL WORKS C O . , I N C . , 
Peti t ioner , 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
for a formal hearing on May 1, 1991. Paul F. Iwasaki, 
Presiding Officer, heard the matter for and on behalf of the 
Commission. Present and representing the Petitioner was 
Craig F. McCullough, Attorney at Law. Present and representing 
the Respondent was John McCarrey, Assistant Attorney General. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is sales tax. 
2. The audit period in question is October 1, 1986, 
through September 31, 1989. 
3. The Petitioner is a Utah corporation which 
fabricates miscellaneous metal and steel structural items such 
as staircases and railings. To accomplish this, the Petitioner 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND FINAL DECISION 
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takes the raw product or steel and fabricates the finished 
product. 
4. At issue in this case are six contracts which 
were entered into rv toe rttiiioi:-' * • - ... -e . ;d. 
5. Two ot the contracts entered into by the 
Petitioner involved wo: K performed on "he construct-, r. of 
temples owned -:••-• - ... orist: of matter Day 
Saints in Portland, Oregon ^no i^o Vegas, Nevada. In both 
jobs, the Petitioner acted ; <. subcontractor. I'hiii L, i tie 
Petit or general contractor te ;. urnish the 
miscellaneous stee: i r - *rr Ai . .: \ •:-* * <\ r.s : -he contract, 
the Petitioner w:v* obligate- • •:. . 
Petitioner did not perform any of the 
installation '* ^  itself, however, subcontracted that" w m k nit 
to other compan]es, 
7. Two of the contracts in question during the audit 
period invo-tved work, performed b\ Mir- Pet iMonei <>h I wo 
buiolinq, nwneii ny governmental agencies Nevada. One of 
those involved work performed v »- ^cCarrer o 1ernaciondl 
Airport, owned b) * Clark o • *i ** ~ nmj^ct 
involved work performed by the Petitionee * v J^WTOC wn 
Transportation Center ooilding owned by the -:itv of Las v*-: , 
8 . On I' '"it t; he f'ot :i i: ion-5 :or - ^ ac^ 0^ a 
general contractor perform the miscellaneous steel woik .oid 
acted as a subcontractor Also, <- * <- M I H 
Pet:iti<iu'i w,n ,1-1 Kjated by the iou;m3 of the subcontract 
agreement -.* n<. . , •• furnish the items required, but was also 
obligated LO mscaj-i the item:;. 
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9. In both jobs, the Petitioner subcontracted the 
installation portion of this obligation to other companies. 
10. On the fifth contract in question, the Petitioner 
entered into a joint venture with another company to gain a 
subcontract to perform structural steel work, including 
miscellaneous steel work for the construction of a hotel in 
Laughlin, Nevada. The Petitioner was awarded the subcontract. 
Pursuant to that subcontract, the Petitioner's partner on the 
joint venture did the structural steel work while the 
Petitioner fabricated the miscellaneous steel items. The 
installation of the items was performed by the Petitioner's 
partner in the joint venture. 
11. On the sixth contract in question, the Petitioner 
entered into a subcontract agreement with a general contractor, 
whereby the Petitioner agreed to furnish and install 
miscellaneous structural steel items in the construction of a 
hotel located in Las Vegas, Nevada. . Although obligated by the 
contract to install the items, the Petitioner subcontracted the 
installation portion of its obligations to another party. 
12. In the course of preparing the fabricated items, 
the Petitioner applies a prime coating of paint that is applied 
to the finished product to protect it from the elements. 
13. The paint purchased by the Petitioner is 
generally purchased in five gallon containers. The paint is 
then diluted with thinner so that the paint is sufficiently 
thin to be used through a sprayer. 
-3-
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14. Once applied to a surface, the thinner's presence 
in the paint evaporates, leaving only the solids present on the 
painted surface. The solids consist of pigment and resins. 
15. During the manufacturing process, specifically 
the welding process, the Petitioner uses gases such as argon 
and carbon dioxide. The purpose of the gases is to protect the 
weld metal from oxidation during cooling, or to stabilize the 
weld arc from jumping around. 
16. The argon and carbon dioxide used during the 
welding process do not become component parts of the finished 
product. 
17. The Petitioner paid sales tax to Nevada on 
property purchased and sold on four of the projects in question. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The sale of tangible personal property to real 
contractors and repairmen of real property is generally subject 
to tax. 
Sales of materials and supplies to contractors for use 
in out of state jobs are taxable unless sold in interstate 
commerce as provided for by Rule R865-19-44S. (Utah State Tax 
Commission Administrative Rule R865-19-58S.) 
Property purchased for resale in this state, in the 
regular course of business, either in its original form or as 
an ingredient or component part of a manufactured or compounded 
product, is exempt from sales tax. (Utah Code Ann. 
§59-12-104(28).) 
-4-
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Sales to the state, its institutions, and its 
political subdivisions are exempt from sales tax. (Utah Code 
Ann. §59-12-104(2).) 
DECISION AND ORDER 
With respect to the work performed by the Petitioner 
on the six contracts in question, the Petitioner maintains that 
purchases of the raw material that it used to fabricate the 
final products are exempt under three theories: 
1. The materials used in the construction of the 
religious buildings were exempt as sales to religious or 
charitable organizations; 
2. The purchase of the materials used in the 
construction of the two government owned buildings were exempt 
as sales to governmental agencies; and 
3. Purchases of the materials used in the 
construction of the two hotels were exempt from sales tax as 
having been interstate sales or, alternatively, purchases made 
for resale. 
The Petitioner further argued that it was not a real 
property contractor, and thus, was not the ultimate consumer of 
the raw materials in question. 
With respect to the Petitioner's argument that the 
temple projects were actually sales to religious entities, the 
Tax Commission finds the Petitioner's argument to be without 
merit. 
-5-
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While it is true that the owners of the buildings were 
religious entities, that fact, in and of itself, does not 
require a finding that those entities were the purchasers of 
the raw steel that was used to fabricate the finished products, 
nor does it mandate a finding that the Petitioner acted as the 
agent for the entities in purchasing the raw materials. Simply 
stated, there is nothing in the record to justify such a 
finding. 
With respect to the Petitioner's argument that the 
governmental building projects in Nevada were actually sales to 
a governmental entity, and thus exempt from sales tax, the Tax 
Commission also finds such argument to be without merit. 
Section 59-12-104(2) of the Utah Code provides for the 
exemption from sales tax on those sales made "to the state". 
The state referred to is the State of Utah and does not extend 
to any other state. Therefore, the exemption upon which the 
Petitioner relies does not exist for states other than Utah. 
The Commission also rejects the Petitioner's 
contention that the transactions involved interstate commerce 
because the goods were shipped out of state and installed in 
Nevada. The Petitioner argues that because the items were 
destined for out of state job sites, the raw materials 
purchased by the Petitioner were not "consumed" within the 
state of Utah, but rather, were "consumed" in Nevada. 
Again, the Petitioner misunderstands the nature of the 
transaction taking place, which is subject to tax. Here, the 
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transaction that is taxable is the sale of the raw materials 
from Utah vendors to the Petitioner. That transaction occurs 
within the state, and because the Petitioner is a real property 
contractor, the items are thus subject to tax. 
Finally, with respect to the contracts, the Petitioner 
claims that it did not operate as a real property contractor. 
The Petitioner claims that the contractual provisions requiring 
them to install the products were placed in the agreement by 
the general contractor simply as a matter of convenience for 
the general contractor, and that the Petitioner itself was not 
required to personally install the items in question. 
While it may be true that the parties to the contract 
fully anticipated the Petitioner to subcontract out its 
obligations regarding the installation of the materials, 
nevertheless, the Petitioner was ultimately responsible for the 
installation of those materials, and was ultimately responsible 
for the failure of any of its subcontractors to meet those 
obligations. Because of the ultimate responsibility of the 
Petitioner to ensure the installation of the materials in 
question, the Petitioner functioned as a real property 
contractor, thus making it liable for payment of the 
appropriate sales tax due. 
Turning next to the Petitioner's argument that the 
welding gasses, paint thinners and solvents are exempt from 
sales tax as items which become an ingredient or component part 
of a manufactured product, the Tax Commission finds such 
-7-
• *fff? v-. v* J- I^IU i -/ V 1 ( 
argument also to be without merit. The uncontroverted 
testimony of witnesses for both parties establish that neither 
the welding gasses nor the thinners and solvents become a 
component part or ingredient of the finished products. 
In its final argument, the Petitioner claims that 
credit must be given for sales tax paid to the state of Nevada 
for property purchased and sold in the McCarren Airport, 
Downtown Transportation Center and hotel jobs. Again, the Tax 
Commission rejects the Petitioner's contention. 
The taxes owed by the Petitioner were first due and 
owing to the state of Utah. The fact that the Petitioner 
mistakenly or inadvertently paid sales tax to Nevada does not 
relieve the Petitioner from its obligations to pay sales tax 
due to the state of Utah. Under such circumstances, the 
Petitioner must pay the sales tax to the state of Utah and 
request an appropriate refund or credit with the state of 
Nevada. This finding is in accord with the multi-state tax 
compact as adopted by Utah and codified as §59-1-801, Utah Code 
Ann., 1953, as amended. 
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Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission affirms 
the determination of the Auditing Division and denies the 
Petitioner's Petition for Redetermination. It is so ordered. 
DATED this tr day of Aj; 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
.ssioner 
B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
fijfalnlJMe-
S. Blaine Willes* 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a 
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(1), 
63-46b-14(2)(a). 
*Since the hearing on this case, Commissioner G. Blaine Davis 
has been replaced by S. Blaine Willes. Commissioner Willes has 
been duly advised of the facts and circumstances regarding f^ Ti^ . 
case, and is qualified to sign this decision. *V^0M^/<^ 
••
stScW-j.) 
PFI/sd/1185w 
* V 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co 
c/o Craig F. McCullough 
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker 
800 Kennecott Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Craig Sandberg 
Assistant Director, Auditing 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
James H. Rogers 
Director, Auditing Div. 
Heber M. Wells Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
John McCarrey 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this k day of J>sgsa^/&/l. , 1991. 
xdrtslfc Qe'srh 
Secretar 
:2£^L 
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